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An article published in the March of 2004 issue of Monitor on Psychiatry discusses why 
Axis II personality disorders (PD) were often not a covered diagnosis by insurance companies 
who otherwise offered behavioral health plans (Kersting 2004, 50-51). Axis II disorders are 
categorized as life-long problems in contrast to problems such as depression, which are typically 
episodic. The article quotes psychologist James Pretzer, PhD, of the Cleveland Center for 
Cognitive Therapy as saying: “For the most part, insurers think personality disorders are a lost 
cause – something they don’t want to cover”(Kersting 2004, 50). Borderline Personality Disorder 
(BPD) has a history of being difficult to treat, and as a result, little research has been conducted 
to show the effectiveness of treatment compared to other mental illnesses.1 Although the lack of 
effective treatment for BPD had begun to change in the 1990s, insurers continued to retain the 
negative perception that this diagnosis is untreatable. Insurance companies saw themselves 
losing money if they covered BPD treatment because many symptoms are not typically treated 
with pharmaceuticals alone (if at all), and the disorder typically cannot be treated in a set amount 
of sessions; it requires extensive individual therapy and is sometimes coupled with group 
sessions (Linehan 2014, 3). While the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) no longer uses the Axis system to differentiate between Axis I symptoms and Axis II 
personality disorders and The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 forced 
insurance companies to end these discriminatory practices, this scenario represents one shocking 
instance of the stigma that surrounds BPD, rendering individuals as “lost causes” for medical 
practice and threatening their ability to have a role in society at large. 
                                                            
1. John G. Gunderson, “Borderline Personality Disorder: Ontogeny of a Diagnosis,” The American Journal of 
Psychiatry 166, no. 5 (2009): 530-539. In the 1980s, the increase in research on BPD coincided with the transition to 
a focus on biological psychiatry. However, Gunderson notes that unlike other psychiatrically defined illnesses, the 
research on BPD was conducted without federal funding.   
2 
 
As we will see, society and social institutions, particularly in a Western, American 
consumer society, regularly embody the borderline diagnosis from which both science and 
culture seem to want to distance themselves. One of the common symptoms of the BPD sufferer 
is what is often referred to as black-and-white or all-or-nothing thinking (Linehan 2014, 291). 
BPD patients will see one negative aspect of a situation and believe that the one aspect renders 
the entire situation worthless. For example, an individual with BPD might have had a negative 
experience in a relationship, and they then take that one instance as evidence that all 
relationships are negative. Their instinct might be to give up on relationships all together. 
Similarly, the insurance companies saw BPD as not being treated effectively in their standard 
short allotment of therapy sessions, and this was seen as negatively affecting their economic 
success. Since BPD didn’t meet their standards of recovery, they chose not to cover the diagnosis 
at all (Kersting 2004, 50-51). This is the epitome of all-or-nothing, black-or-white thinking. 
Unfortunately many other social institutions today don’t allow for the realistic occurrence of a 
gray area; somewhere between all and nothing. In fact, many more similarities have been drawn 
by psychologists and social theorists between BPD symptoms and American consumer society. 
Although we may understand the behavior of the insurance company as economic business 
practices, the medical model establishes parameters for how to view those who suffer from BPD 
without any particular consideration of how or why those symptoms came to be. By solely 
focusing on identified symptoms, this model similarly categorizes individuals in an all-or-
nothing manner, which shows a lack of understanding of the gray areas of individual experience, 
and, in turn, perpetuates the stigmatization of BPD that extends beyond the bounds of medicine 
into culture.  
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In contrast to the model that merely refers to behavior as symptoms with which society 
can disregard, thereby disqualifying the concerns of the diagnosed, this essay places value on the 
subjective experiences of the “untreatable” BPD sufferer in order to reveal what BPD can teach 
us about society at large. Erving Goffman (1963) suggests stigmatized individuals are those who 
are perceived by the societies they live in to deviate from cultural norms and related social 
fantasies of perfection (5). Those with BPD are said (in those social discourses, including 
medicalized discourses) to fall outside of cultural norms of emotional expression, behavior, and 
mental processes. The category of mental illness – what I term mental disability – discredits the 
voices of individuals as incapable of contributing to social discourse and contesting actions that 
affect them personally.2 My research provides a voice for the experiences of BPD and shows that 
what can be said to be a clinical diagnosis of a select few can be more widely applied to reveal 
how sociocultural practices influence our behavior and ideas.    
  This essay proceeds in three parts. First, I examine the historical emergence of borderline 
as a psychiatric diagnosis. Second, I address how symptoms of BPD relate to contemporary 
Western issues of self and identity. Finally, confronting the vexed diagnosis of BPD alongside its 
therapeutic model Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT), I analyze three experimental films –
 Maya Deren and Alexander Hammid’s Meshes of the Afternoon (1943), Maya Deren’s At 
Land (1944), and John Akomfrah’s Handsworth Songs (1986) – that engage an aesthetic of self-
transformation and human variation. Drawing on Tobin Siebers’s use of disability as an aesthetic 
value in modern art, these films reveal how “symptoms” of strong emotion, varied behavior, and 
differing mental experiences draw upon social and cultural sources. I’ll consider these readings 
                                                            
2. My reasons for choosing this terminology are twofold. First, in her article “Defining Mental Disability”, 
Margaret Price (2013) speaks of the term as a way to foster a sense of community and understanding among the 
disparate forms of dis/ability (305). Additionally, I use the term to echo Lennard Davis’s (2002) statement that 
disability is a that condition has been turned into a negative by society, which then causes barriers to access (12).    
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in relation to Lennard Davis’ concept of the dismodernist subject, which focuses not on a 
medical model but on a nuanced model of human rights that perceives difference as what unites 
individuals. Through a reading of how these films use stigmatized “symptoms” of BPD to 
express problematic issues of identity, I propose that these films can convey what social 
transformations would need to be implemented to bring about a dismodern subject.  
An Elusive Diagnosis 
The term “borderline” was first used in 1938 by Adolph Stern (1938) to describe a growing 
number of patients who did not fit into either the neurotic or psychotic categories of psychology 
(467). Neurotic patients were those who could be treated successfully with psychoanalysis, while 
those labeled psychotic were unaffected by this therapy. From the very introduction of this term 
into psychological discourse, it was used to describe a patient that was difficult to treat; a patient 
who challenged the effectiveness of psychoanalysis’ therapeutic means. Some criticized the 
naming of the diagnosis because by creating a borderline group, psychoanalysis was able to hold 
its position as an effective treatment for cases of neurosis (Gunderson, 2009). Instead of 
considering the potential incompleteness of the treatment, a new classification of disease was 
created that placed these patients somewhere between treatable and untreatable. The patient, not 
the therapy or therapist, was seen as problematic. Despite these considerations in the early days 
of the diagnosis, the name and the view of BPD as difficult to treat have persisted. Additionally, 
these first writings on this new group of patients also contributed to the construction of 
symptoms, specifically “stable instability” and an unstable sense of self, which are still 
recognized today. 
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The history of BPD’s diagnosis and classification seems as unstable as the patients 
themselves are said to be. The term was originally used to suggest a tendency for borderline 
schizophrenia. It was decided in the 1970s that borderline was not related to schizophrenia, but 
there was still confusion in 1980, when BPD appeared in the DSM, about what exactly it was 
and how it could be treated. Others proposed that it was an atypical form of depression until 
clinical research suggested that it was its own separate classification of disease. Feminist 
psychologists and clinicians also began to acknowledge the critical overlap in symptoms with 
PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), and as research found that many BPD patients had a 
history as victims of abuse (70%), they questioned whether the diagnosis was in actuality 
pathologizing and blaming victims.3 It has been acknowledged relatively recently that “about 
90% of patients with the BPD diagnosis also share at least one other psychiatric diagnosis” 
(Gunderson, 2009). Some express concern that this diagnosis has become a catch-all for 
symptoms that don’t fit properly into DSM’s constructed categories of illness. Despite all this 
uncertainty, BPD remained its own distinct diagnosis while researchers still had little 
understanding of what to do to ease the suffering of the patient with BPD. Finally, in the 1990s, 
BPD came to be described as an emotion dysregulation disorder, which helped to “explain 
[BPD’s] comorbidities and its spectrum relationship with other disorders” (Gunderson 2009). 
However, in the contemporary model of biological psychiatry, its lack of successful 
pharmacological and therapeutic treatment has still caused uncertainty. 
Today, BPD, which is said to affect 1.4%-5.9% of the population, is described in the DSM-
5 (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Illness) as “a pattern of instability in 
interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity” (American 
                                                            
3. For further analysis of the commonalities between BPD and PTSD see Dana Becker, Through the Looking 
Glass: Women and Borderline Personality Disorder (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 70-78.  
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Psychiatric Association, 2013). For one to qualify for the medical diagnosis of BPD, an 
individual must have at least five of the following symptoms: 
1.  Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. (Note: Do not include suicidal or 
self-mutilating behavior covered in Criterion 5.) 
2. A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating 
between extremes of idealization and devaluation. 
3. Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self. 
4. Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g., spending, sex, 
substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating). (Note: Do not include suicidal or self-
mutilating behavior covered in Criterion 5.) 
5. Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior. 
6. Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense episodic dysphoria, 
irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more than a few days). 
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness. 
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g., frequent displays of 
temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights). 
9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms (American 
Psychiatric Association 2013) 
These symptoms of self-destructive behavior, physical self-harm, feelings of emptiness, and 
intense emotion demonstrate the real suffering experienced by patients. At the same time, it is 
apparent that in many ways BPD is significantly categorized by instability. Drawing on sources 
from both the medical and cultural spheres, I would like to foreground the idea that this suffering 
is in part caused by a lack of sense of self.  
It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss the many theories of the self that have been 
written. However, it is important that I lay out the basic understandings of the self that informs 
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this essay since BPD is primarily written about in relation to a lack of self, an empty self, or an 
unstable self. As we will see in the text that follows, these ideas are critical to understanding 
borderline’s relevance in the contemporary cultural sphere. In her article “Spirits and Selves in 
Northern Sudan: The Cultural Therapeutics of Possession and Trance,” Janice Boddy (1988) 
describes the self as “a theoretical construct [that] can be provisionally conceptualized, not as an 
entity, but as a creative energy or process, which actively engages the world, integrating the 
human biological organism with its physical and sociocultural environments, continually 
moving, becoming, maturing, making and organizing meaning” (16). According to this model, 
the self is a process that oscillates between two points: culturally determined meaning and 
critical subjectivity. It takes experience and makes meaning through one’s sociocultural 
environment, but it is also able to be critical of that culturally created meaning to allow for 
individual growth. Boddy suggests that the Hofriyati woman’s selves are overdetermined by 
culture and what we call neurosis in Western society is, in contrast, overdetermined by 
subjectivity.4 Being overdetermined by subjectivity leaves an individual without the ability to 
locate themselves and make sense of their experience through a singular cultural context. In the 
case of BPD, an individual has the ability to be aware of the individual. While they may attempt 
to orient themselves in a single space that gives an understanding of what is right or wrong, 
important or unimportant, they end up finding not one but a plethora of possibilities in their 
postmodern environment. An individual finds that adhering to any one moral understanding of 
the world can mean being invalidated by another moral understanding. In order to deal with these 
                                                            
4. Janice Boddy, “Spirits and Selves in Northern Sudan: The Cultural Therapeutics of Possession and 
Trance,” American Ethnologist 15, no. 1 (1988): 4-27. In her article, Boddy sights the multiple, everyday events in 
Hofriyati society that signify women’s place within their culture. However, when a woman’s experience fails to 
coincide with these significations, practices of possession are used to renegotiate meaning and reincorporate women 
into their cultural context.  
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contrasting viewpoints, a BPD patient will shift their ways of making sense of the world 
according to their social environment in order to avoid invalidation.    
  Marsha Linehan developed Dialectical behavioral therapy (DBT) in the 1990s as a 
treatment for BPD, especially those who were chronically suicidal. Through her research, 
Linehan (2014) came to describe the patient with BPD as having a sensitive predisposition and 
as having experienced an invalidating environment (7-9). This branch of cognitive behavioral 
therapy draws on the ideas of the Eastern philosophical tradition and focuses on teaching patients 
skills of mindfulness, radical acceptance, a nonjudgmental stance, and emotion regulation.5 With 
the stigma that still surrounds these patients as being difficult to treat and the fact that it is the 
“only major psychiatric disorder for which psychosocial interventions remain the primary 
treatment,” other psychologists and sociologist have proposed what the sources of this 
invalidating environment might be (Gunderson, 2009). 
 In their book I Hate You- Don’t Leave Me, a work that seeks to understand personality 
disorders, Kreisman and Straus suggest that our own environment contributes to BPD symptoms 
by socializing individuals in a world full of contradictions. They refer to this as “The Borderline 
Society” (1989, 60-82). We are constantly bombarded with opposing messages about what cause 
is worthy of our attention and which religion or political affiliation provides the path to salvation 
(66). The media rapidly shifts back and forth between stories of hunger, disease and images that 
promote affluence. Simon Gottschalk (2000), in his essay “Escape from Insanity: ‘Mental 
Disorder’ in the Postmodern Moment,” states that one would have to be borderline just to keep 
up with our current world (30). When expert knowledge is quickly contested by a new study or 
                                                            
5. See Marsha M. Linehan, DBT Skills Training Manual (New York: The Guilford Press, 2014). 
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technological advancements make products obsolete in a matter of months, we can see 
characteristics of instability and discontinuity as strategies instead of pathology.  “We would be 
naïve to believe that the cumulative effect of all this change – the excruciating pull of opposing 
forces – has no effect on our psyches” (Kreisman and Straus, 1989, 67). Priorities, values, and a 
sense of self become more and more difficult to keep constant as we try to find a balance 
between these conflicting demands. One’s values can be quickly invalidated in a culture 
characterized by intense change and loudly out-spoken, extreme opposing viewpoints. In order to 
avoid this invalidation, one may internalize this “mythical polarity” (this all or nothing attitude) 
that exists in multiple aspects of Western, particularly American, society. 
Additionally, Kreisman and Straus (1989) suggest that, within this contemporary 
environment, many Western cultures lack “social rapprochement” (65). This is described through 
psychological discourse as part of a “separation-individuation phase” in which an infant 
separates themselves from the mother, but returns to her as a comforting anchor (65). When this 
process is disturbed, “a lack of trust, [unstable] relationships, emptiness, anxiety, and an 
uncertain self-image” emerge (65). Kreisman and Straus assert that our own fractured society 
contributes to this lack of social rapprochement. People change geographical locations more 
frequently and ties to community are often weak. Today, the possibilities for a moral order in 
which a person can make sense of their place in the world are numerous. In this globalized 
environment, critical self-awareness increases, but a singular sense of self, a moral order, a social 
rapprochement has become more difficult to determine. In an attempt to gain control of their 
environment, to find comfort, people may turn to pathological behaviors such as eating disorder, 
drug abuse, or other forms of self-harm (65).  
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  Due to the fact that women make up 70-77 percent of BPD diagnoses, other writers have 
looked at BPD and the unstable sense of self through the place of women in society. The often 
multiple contradictory, unrealistic, societal expectations that a woman may internalize also place 
her in-between symbolic orders (motherhood, nationalism, religion). Again, there exists an 
awareness of the individual, but an inability to fully locate oneself in any single cultural, moral 
framework. Additionally, to occupy these extreme contradictions simultaneously is impossible. 
The best one can do is to develop hyperawareness of social situations and adapt one’s identity 
accordingly to avoid invalidation.  
 Not coincidentally, people diagnosed with BPD are often described as having a keen 
social awareness and social adaptability. In her essay “Border Disorders,” Susan Cahn (2014) 
quotes clinicians who suggest that the borderline patient “may reflect disturbed identity masked 
by mimicry, a form of rapid and superficial identification with others” (263). In going so far as 
calling this identity “disturbed,” clinicians reflect the stigma and misunderstanding of the 
diagnosis that still exists in the field of medicine, and psychology’s focus on the individual. The 
need to identify with others comes from a desire to have borders, to have a way to fit into the 
symbolic order and, at the same time, to be recognized as a legitimate subject (Cahn 2014, 276). 
An unstable sense of self is more productively seen as a struggle to legitimate the self through a 
moral order and avoid invalidation in a rapidly changing environment that so often neglects the 
subject positions of women and other oppressed groups. In this way, I would suggest that a stable 
sense of self is very much a position of privilege. The BPD patient’s sense of self shifts rapidly 
to ensure that one fits into the symbolic order of their current environment which works as a 
strategy to prevent invalidation and social disqualification. Paradoxically, this attempt to avoid 
such disqualification creates such psychic and emotional stress that the individual again falls 
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under a category of abnormality. The borderline subject with its stable instability of self can be 
understood as a mentality that understands the malleable nature of identity and recognizes the 
social disqualification that comes with not fulfilling their position in any given moral order. It is 
the ability to have a critical distance from cultural norms, but no single moral order that offers 
social rapprochement.  
I propose that this unstable self of BPD can provide further understanding of Lennard 
Davis’s concept of dismodernism. Davis addresses the current state of identity politics, 
particularly in the United States, and finds that, as we have already seen, defining one’s identity 
has become increasingly more difficult due to the proliferation of or the differentiation within 
identity categories. To understand this fractured and unstable notion of identity that Davis 
discusses, it is important to note that:  
[m]odernist institutions, as nurtured within the Enlightenment, and fulgently flowering 
within the present century, are importantly premised on the assumption of persons as 
quintessentially interior, that is, imbued with an inner domain of selfhood – replete with 
rational capacities, observational sensitivity, emotional and motivational wellsprings, and 
the capacity for conscious choice. (Gergen, 2000, 100) 
 When the modern subject is unstable, it is due to the fact that they are not living up to these 
ideals. But this instability allows for growth and a critical look at the modernist ideology of the 
self. Postmodernist identities become more numerous in the sense that specific social identities 
are provided a voice that had been previously denied, but these groups are increasingly fractured 
as diversity within these groups continues to be identified. Postmodern theory also begins to 
analyze the social construction of identity within the symbolic order (Davis 2002, 12-13). The 
internal self and all the qualities attributed to it are instead seen as reliant on sociocultural 
relations. This deconstruction however, leaves us without a single symbolic order through which 
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we make meaning of our world (13). Instead there are many more ways in which an individual 
can perform as identity is continually fractured. Identity politics, through deconstruction and 
providing a voice for the marginalized, has succeeded in taking a critical stance towards 
oppressive dominant ideology; however, it doesn’t create a means for the individual to deal with 
the fractured identities that it produces. 
Although Davis sees the current work of identity politics as being important, he also 
suggests that these discourses have run their course in their ability to produce equality. “The 
fracturing of identities based on somatic markers will eventually be seen as a device to distract us 
from the unity of new ways of regarding humans and their bodies to further social justice and 
freedom” (Davis 2002, 30). The exclusivity of identity categories makes it difficult to see that all 
intersect with “the mechanism of disablement,” disablement being the process that turns a quality 
“into a negative by creating barriers to access” (13). He suggests instead that difference and 
social dependence should be the new moral order that unites us. Instead of the complete, 
autonomous subject, difference and dependence should be what is normal and it should be 
society’s role to accommodate that difference and create equality. Dismodernism proposes the 
stable instability of the disabled subject as representative of this position. It unifies the fracturing 
of identity within postmodernism by radically accepting instability and the need for 
accommodation. Individuals often move in and out of states of disability throughout their life-
time and this instability is due to changes in technology, environment, and society. Cures are 
found, accidents happen, and different qualities come to be seen as limitations. The ethic of 
caring about the body allows us to focus on “the oppression of so-called abnormal bodies” and 
how bodies have been used to make meaning (28).   
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As Davis is considering how to unify group identity, BPD retains a consideration of this 
ethical point of view from the standpoint of the individual. People with BPD are without a form 
of social rapprochement, or without a comforting anchor through which they may make sense of 
their world. Their identity becomes fractured in an attempt to avoid invalidation in a social 
environment that contains multiple, often contradictory, ways of making meaning. Identity 
politics have also become fractured in their attempt to maintain a critical stance against 
oppressive dominant ideologies. In this sense, group identities also lack a form of rapprochement 
through which a new form of human rights can be implemented. Dismodernism offers that 
renewal of relations for identity groups, and Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT) offers a form 
of rapprochement for individuals. By addressing the parallels between the fracturing of group 
identity and the fracturing of the self, I explain through the reading of three films how BPD and 
DBT offer understandings of what processes on the individual level must occur to bring about a 
dismodern subject.    
Filming BPD 
What I propose is that this unique diagnosis can support an understanding of 
contemporary Western society in which relations and contexts are rapidly dissolved and 
reformed. By reading three films through the diagnosis of BPD and its treatment of DBT, I aim 
to show how these artists create images of the struggle of individuals and groups in this 
borderline society in order to bring about greater understanding and equality. In his book 
Disability Aesthetics, Tobin Siebers argues that disability is an aesthetic of modern art that has 
allowed artists to reconsider what it is to be human. It is an aesthetic of human variation and 
transformation (Siebers 2010, 40). This art complicates our understanding of aesthetics which is 
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typically reliant on the ideals of perfection and normalcy. These aesthetics based on the ideal can 
be used to disqualify individuals with disabilities. By recognizing and accepting disability’s role 
in art, by embracing the aesthetic of disability, Siebers suggests that it allows us to also accept 
disability itself (40). We no longer use human variation as a way to signal inferiority. The use of 
disability aesthetics when reading art creates a way to focus on the social meanings of disability 
instead of the medicalization of individuals.    
Before I continue with these reading, I want to express that I am in no way suggesting 
that the entirety of Western culture is suffering from BPD. Additionally, I am not suggesting that 
these filmmakers or the characters/people that their films portray have BPD. At the same time, I 
am saying that patients with BPD are a symptom of a larger societal trend: “In truth, what we are 
calling individual ‘psychopathology,’ and are treating as such, are only the more extreme cases 
of a collective suffering in which we all take part in accordance with our individual constitution 
and character”.6 Patients with BPD are only more sensitive to these problematic issues of 
identity than others. By observing BPD symptoms through film, which through the manipulation 
of time and space can communicate the reasons for these unstable identities, we can both lessen 
stigma surrounding the disorder and understand a more effective way of developing a symbolic 
order through which we can make sense of our unstable environment. 
Maya Deren’s films are appropriate for a BPD reading not only because of their content 
but also because of Deren’s understanding of the artistic uses of film. Deren was the child of 
Russian immigrants to the United States and came to study politics, poetry, modern dance and 
film throughout her short life. At the time that Deren made her first film, Meshes of the 
                                                            
6. Davis Michael Kleinberg-Levin, Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies on Narcissism, 
Schizophrenia, and Depression. (New York: New York University Press, 1987), quoted in Simon Gottschalk, 
“Escape from Insanity,” in Pathology and the Postmodern, ed. Dwight Fee (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 37. 
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Afternoon (1943) with her husband Alexander Hammid, Hollywood was forming a market that 
had its own established categories of subject/object, good/evil, complete/incomplete and formed 
a film language that very much promoted these categories as inherent. Deren herself wrote about 
her disappointment with traditional commercial narrative film and about the artistic possibilities 
that remained untapped in film as an art form. Her criticism of commercial film comments on the 
ways in which the motion picture industry maintains a strict hierarchical dichotomy between 
abnormal and normal states of mind. In contrast, she praises the ways that film as an art form can 
serve as expression for the problems of unstable identity. 
In her essay “Cinema as an Art Form,” Deren (2005) suggests that when we call art 
‘creative,’ what we are saying is that “it creates a reality and itself constitutes an 
experience”(22). She compares this to Hollywood film and suggests that “the best use of 
cinematic form appears in those commercial films which seek to describe an abnormal state of 
mind and its abnormal perception of reality” (22). This type of cinematic form is evident in 
horror films or psychological films. But the goal in these films’ narratives is to “fix” this state of 
mind by bringing it back to its “normal condition.” Deren sums up this observation by stating: “. 
. . the imaginative experience which is, for the artist, a desired normality, is, for the motion 
picture industry a dangerous, psychic illegality” (23). For Deren, art seeks to understand and 
share subjective experience, and she insists that this approach does not make film inaccessible 
because the emotions expressed through the medium are universal. 
Secondly, Deren contextualizes film by acknowledging the other types of knowledge and 
technology that developed during the same time period. The theory of relativity, the airplane, and 
the radio influence human ideology, but Deren (2005) argues that they are also products of, or 
influenced by, human ideology (30). According to Deren, the airplane and radio created a 
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“relativistic reality of time and space” (30). She compares this with an absolutist philosophy of 
time and space; a time and space that is defined and stable. Essentially, developments in 
transportation and communication collapse distinctions between different times and different 
spaces. Both here and there, or then and now, become equally accessible. Instead we find that we 
must reframe each object from a relative standpoint. An object’s value is not inherent but created 
through its relationship to other objects. Value is relational and not absolute. It is subject to 
constant change as relations are often dissolved and built new. Deren states that, “[t]he 
individual, deprived of the absolutisms which moulded the moral patterns of his life, is faced 
with a critical, desperate need to discover in himself an integrity at once constant enough to 
constitute an identity, and adjustable enough to relate to an apparently anarchic universe . . .” 
(31). This awareness of relativity and the lack of moral order reflect the conundrum in which 
patients with BPD find themselves. How does one develop an identity while also existing in a 
world where objects occupy an unstable position in an ever-changing frame of reference? Deren 
believes that film can serve as an expression for these problems.  
Meshes of the Afternoon begins from the point of view of a woman, played by Deren, 
picking up a flower on the sidewalk and ascending a set of steps that lead to the front door of her 
home. The woman’s hands are shown pulling out a key, and when she enters her home, she finds 
domestic objects in disarray. From her point of view, a knife is shown to fall from a loaf of bread 
on a kitchen table and the phone has been left off the hook. Traveling upstairs to the second floor 
of the home, the woman’s hand reaches to turn off a record player in an otherwise ordinary, 
austere bedroom. Finally, the woman returns down the steps and reclines in a chair facing a large 
window, which overlooks the walkway from which she entered. We see a close-up of her eye as 
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she falls asleep in the chair. This first series of events is all portrayed without revealing the 
woman’s face.  
The camera then peers out the window to see a cloaked figure with a mirrored face.  Out 
the window, the same woman runs after the cloaked figure, but it escapes her. She then turns to 
ascend the steps that lead to her home. The woman’s face is revealed for the first time as she 
enters. This doubling of the character and the fact that we only now see her face creates the 
woman as both observer and observed, subject and object. When the woman enters the house for 
a second time, she finds different objects in disarray, which signals a different version of the 
relative self. This time when she attempts to ascend the stairs of the house, it seems as if gravity 
has been altered; her steps become strenuous leaps. She finds the phone off the hook in the 
bedroom and the knife is now sitting on the bed. She catches her reflection in the knife and 
swiftly covers it with the bed sheets. In her book, Maya Deren: Incomplete Control, Sarah Keller 
(2015) suggests that when the knife “offers shots in which the protagonist’s eyes appear 
reflected, . . . the subjectivity established so painstakingly by the sequence at the beginning 
implies potential violence . . .” (53). One of the symptoms of BPD is self-damaging behavior, 
often acted out through self-mutilation. This is understood by some as a strategy for avoiding the 
emptiness, the dissolution of the self or the fragmentation of self from which patients suffer.7 
Pain becomes a way to feel as if there is something real and grounding in an unstable 
environment. In Meshes, the knife, signaling violence and physical pain, is the only way to 
develop a sense of intactness or social rapprochement. However, the woman is conflicted as she 
quickly rejects this violent reflection and the intactness that is offers. When the woman finally 
returns down the stairs, she observes herself asleep in the recliner.  
                                                            
7. Janet Wirth-Cauchon, “A Dangerous Symbolic Mobility: Narratives of Borderline Personality Disorder,” in 
Pathology and the Postmodern ed. Dwight Fee (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 149. 
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This second version of the protagonist looks out the window to see yet another version of 
her attempting to chase the cloaked figure. When the figure escapes her, she again turns to climb 
the steps leading to the house. This third version of the protagonist enters the house and follows 
the cloaked figure up the stairs. Again, this ascent upstairs is arduous, this time thrashed back 
and forth as if on a ship navigating turbulent waters.  As she reaches the top step, she struggles to 
see her reflection in the mirrored face of the cloaked figure before it disappears into thin air.  
This repeated attempt to chase down the cloaked figure and observe herself in the mirrored face 
signals an attempt to find a stable sense of self. However, the cloaked figure, her stable sense of 
self, always escapes her, and instead, another version of the protagonist enters the film.   
The cycle repeats itself yet again. This third self watches a fourth self running after the 
cloaked figure and then abandoning the chase to enter the house. This fourth self enters the 
house, this time holding the knife from previous scenes, and goes to sit down at a kitchen table 
with the other two selves. As the multiple selves congregate around the kitchen table, the original 
protagonist remains asleep in the armchair. When this most recently introduced self places the 
knife on the table, it turns into a key. The three selves sit around the table taking turns picking up 
the key, but when the last self picks up the key, it turns back into the knife. The fourth self, now 
wearing a pair of reflective goggles, takes the knife and approaches the original protagonist 
asleep in the armchair. As she approaches the original protagonist, the shot is intercut with 
dissonant shots of this threatening multiple self walking through tall grass on a beach. This 
multiple self positioned on the beach signals the fluidity of the self as well as the fluidity of the 
spatiotemporal environment that the multiples represent. The fluidity of the self, the lack of 
determined meaning, becomes the cause of suffering and the demise of the stable self.  
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As this fourth self with the knife reaches the original woman asleep in the armchair, the 
woman wakes up and throws her hands over her face defensively. However, the person in front 
of her is no longer her double but a man who kisses her, warmly reaches out to her, and lifts her 
out of the chair. He leads her upstairs to the bed, while carrying the flower from the very first 
shot of the film. The man places the flower on the bed and the woman lies down next to it. A 
close up of her face shows the flower next to her head suddenly replaced by the knife, which she 
grabs and impulsively swings in the direction of the man’s face. But when the knife strikes, what 
appeared to be the man’s face shows to be merely a reflection in a mirror. The shards of mirror 
fall revealing ocean waves behind it.  
Another significant symptom attributed to BPD is the idea of unstable interpersonal 
relationships, often characterized by shifting between extreme idealization and devaluation 
(American Psychiatric Association 2013). Idealization is typically due to a patient with BPD’s 
ability to stabilize themselves, albeit briefly, in relation to others. However, if this sense of self is 
invalidated in any way, this grounding relationship fails to provide comfort, and the individual is 
again set adrift in instability. Similar to the symptom of self-damaging behavior, those diagnosed 
with BPD will also often create emotional distress through relationships as a way to ground 
themselves in the experience of strong emotion. The fact that the man’s face turns out to be a 
mirror represents the futility in attempting to stabilize the self in this relationship. This is 
reinforced by the fact that behind the broken mirror that previously reflected the man’s face lays 
rolling ocean waves.    
The final scene shows the man enter the house with the flower, seeing the interior of the 
house in disarray, and finally finding the woman dead in the armchair, covered in seaweed and 
shards of mirror. It is this inability to find anything stable (herself, her partner, objects in the 
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house) that leads to the character’s demise. In Meshes, symptoms of BPD are apparent in these 
multiple selves and the desperate attempts to find a single sense of self through which meaning 
can be stabilized. The reoccurrence of mirrors and the multiplication of the woman in the film 
create a conflicting binary between self and other. Sarah Keller (2015) states: “[m]irrors for 
Deren thus work along the lines of managing binary relationships, the most prominent of which 
is self/other. The tension between these is most ably expressed through the film’s murderous 
desire to eliminate the divide between self and other, or rather, to eliminate the other, which is 
also the self as depicted here” (53). The conflict between the self, a stable interior identity, and 
the other, multiple identities that are reliant on social relations, is shown in the multiples’ desire 
to murder the self.  This resonates with the BPD symptom of frequent suicide attempts. In this 
way, suicide attempts are more clearly understood as a conflict of identity that seems to have no 
resolution in a society that offers only a relative sense of self without any social rapprochement. 
One of the ways that Deren finds expression for these issues of identity is through the use 
of a film structure based on “circular logic” (Keller, 2015, 53). The repetitive nature of the film 
does not offer the usual narrative path towards resolution. Instead, meaning is discovered 
through repetition. It avoids the typical definitive resolution of commercial film that often 
defines elements of the narrative as distinctly good or bad, right or wrong. This narrative 
technique echoes the Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT) skill of a nonjudgmental stance 
(Linehan 2014, 155). DBT emphasizes a nonjudgmental stance in order to create mindfulness in 
the individual and create emotional stability. The nonjudgmental stance encourages patients to 
engage in observation instead of ultimately and strictly categorizing experience as good/bad or 
right/wrong. By not categorizing or judging, a person can achieve what Deren (2005) refers to as 
“innocent receptivity,” which, as she insists, “permits the perception and the experience of the 
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new reality” (23). Without fighting a new reality or experience in a fluid and unstable existence, 
the experience becomes more tolerable and can even permit understanding. It seems that this 
practice of a nonjudgmental stance is not only helpful to patients diagnosed with BPD, but it 
could in fact aid in the implementation of a dismodernist ideology which encourages the view of 
all individuals as nonstandard instead of categorizing bodies as abnormal. If the dismodern 
subject is in fact an unstable one, our ability to tolerate and understand this instability is 
dependent upon our ability to be nonjudgmental and refuse to divide, categorize, and marginalize 
individuals.  
Deren’s second film, At Land, created in 1944, retains this refusal to categorize, or as 
Sarah Keller (2015) describes it, it retains a sense of incompletion (90). The title itself is a kind 
of play on words. Typically we think of the phrase ‘at sea’ to mean being confused or without 
any solid foundation. Here, Deren subverts our typical assumption of land as being a stable, 
defined place. At the same time, this second film puts more emphasis on the relationship 
between the individual and the surrounding world. The film starts with a woman, again played 
by Deren, being washed up on a beach. The woman climbs up a large piece of drift-wood on the 
shore, which leads her to a banquet hall. She climbs onto a long table, and as she climbs across 
the table, crowded by seated guests, the scene is intercut with shots of the woman climbing 
through a dense brush. The disparate environments connected through the individual protagonist 
signals the overwhelming pressure placed on the protagonist by the rapidly shifting outside 
world.    
As the woman reaches the opposite end of the table, where a man has just abandoned a 
chess game, she watches as chess pieces move unaided by human hand to different positions on 
the board. This chess game and the woman’s undetected climb across the banquet table echo the 
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kinds of interpersonal difficulties pathologized in BPD. The crawl through a social environment 
intercut with a crawl through a thick mass of brush signals how much of an arduous task social 
interaction can be. The chess pieces indicate that one’s strategy both on the chess-board and in 
social situations changes depending on the relation of the pieces at any given moment. This 
continually shifting position produces no core inner self as goals, motivation, and strategy are 
determined by outer reality.  
As the woman watches the chess pieces move across the board, a single pawn falls off the 
edge of the table, and the next shot shows it traveling down a stream of water. The woman jumps 
off the table to follow the pawn only to have it always slightly out of reach. The fact that she is 
specifically chasing the pawn piece signals that she does not occupy a position of power in a 
larger game. The pawns are especially vulnerable to this lack of stability as they can easily be 
knocked off the board depending on their relative position to the other pieces. Similarly, 
marginalized individuals can be more easily invalidated or disqualified by powerful individuals 
or institutions. This creates the need for an unstable self that can socially adapt to avoid 
invalidation.    
The next scene depicts the woman walking down a dirt road accompanied by a man. 
They converse as they walk forward, but every time the woman looks up, a different man 
appears. As with other environmental discontinuities in the film, the woman’s body fluidly 
connected with disparate environments and individuals suggests that she is inundated with 
multiple social/environmental pressures. The last man walks more briskly, but casually, down 
the road and into the door of a cabin. The woman struggles frantically to catch up with him, both 
running and reaching out to him. The woman follows the man and enters the cabin through a 
hole in the wall. Her frantic effort to avoid his seemingly casual abandonment reflects the first 
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diagnostic criteria in the DSM attributed to individuals with BPD. The woman is content as she 
walks down the path with the different men because she finds her identity in relation to others, 
but this sense of identity is fleeting. As soon as the man leaves her side, she struggles to regain 
her position in relation to him. The frantic effort to avoid abandonment is motivated by the fear 
of the empty self that lies beneath this encounter.  
Shortly after entering the cabin, she travels through a series of doors until she finds one 
that leads to a cliff overlooking the beach. She climbs down onto the shore and begins urgently 
collecting armfuls of large rocks. Abruptly, she abandons her rock collecting, distracted by two 
women playing a game of chess on the beach. She watches them play for a moment, until 
suddenly all three women are sitting on the same side of the chess-board. The women continue 
playing their game while Deren’s character distracts them by lovingly stroking their hair. 
Unexpectedly, Deren’s character snatches a pawn from the chess-board and runs away. As she 
runs, she travels through all the previous scenes of the film, and as she does so, her previous self 
from each of the scenes looks up to observe her. The film ends with a shot of Deren’s character 
running down the beach with the pawn piece in hand.  
Many writers agree that At Land deals with the subject of oppositional binaries, yet how 
those binaries operate in the film is seen in different ways. Maria Pramaggiore (2001) reads 
Deren’s work through a bisexual lens and sees this stealing of the chess piece as a refusal of the 
social dualism represented by the game of chess (251-252). However, as we have seen, a BPD 
reading sees this game of chess not as a binary but as instability. Sarah Keller’s reading of this 
film provides a way to incorporate this instability by addressing themes in the game of chess. 
The fact that Deren’s character attempts to rescue away a pawn piece throughout the scenes in 
the film and also observes others playing games of chess positions her between the binary of 
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chance and mastery (Keller 2015, 90-94). The character attempts to be both inside and outside 
the game and is conflicted regarding which position to occupy. The pawn piece risks being 
disqualified from the game, and to save this piece from disqualification, the woman attempts to 
master the game by separating the piece from its relative context. However, this does not allow 
for the game to conclude because the events in the film still position the woman within a larger 
game (94).  
This final scene of the film gives understanding to the BPD symptom of paranoid-
ideation (American Psychiatric Association 2013). In a rapidly shifting social context, the 
individual with BPD may become paranoid that at any moment their sense of self could be 
invalidated. Even if they attempt to master a situation and develop a keen social awareness, 
avoiding invalidation becomes more difficult when in the presence of multiple conflicting points 
of view or a quickly shifting environment. Feeling threatened by the possibility of invalidation, 
an individual might dissociate themselves from others. However, dissociation is not an effective 
way of existing in society, just as running away with a chess piece is not an effective way to play 
a game. Attempting to separate one’ self from social/cultural contexts also leaves one without a 
way of making meaning. Struggles to balance these realities of chance and mastery are present in 
both the film and the symptoms of patients diagnosed with BPD. Keller (2015) writes: 
Deren frequently expressed her interest in a state that would accommodate being 
simultaneously inside and outside of a situation, signaling her desire for both the 
immediacy of direct experience and the distance required for seeing it as part of a larger 
pattern or system. Placement such as being both pawn and master of the game of chess – 
at once inside and outside – announces At Land’s investigation of subjective vs. objective 
positions. (94)  
 The self, as laid out by Boddy, suggests that finding a place within society through which one 
can make meaning of the world and finding a critical distance from society to facilitate growth 
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are both important elements. In a rapidly changing, fractured environment, identifying a single 
validated place within society becomes difficult.  An individual with BPD may desire to distance 
themselves from situations in which they could be invalidated, but complete abandonment of 
social situations also leaves one without a sense of self.    
DBT’s advice for this conundrum that Deren describes is called “wise mind.” Wise mind 
creates what Marsha Linehan (2014) calls a “synthesis of extremes” (225). It is a merging of 
both analysis and experience, or a merging of both our construct of reality that provides us with a 
moral order and our experiences that defy this moral order. To go between extremes, focusing 
solely on detached analysis or focusing solely on emotion, creates either a lack of empathy or a 
lack of effectiveness respectively (225). Linehan suggests that “we replace ‘either – or’ with 
‘both – and’ thinking” in order to achieve this dialectical wise mind (226). If we use only our 
own construct of reality to make sense of the world, then we risk invalidating other’s realities. 
However, if we only focus on the unstable nature of experience then we are without the ability to 
make sense of those experiences. One of the ways of cultivating this synthesis is being willing 
instead of willful (84-85). Being willful means that a person focuses solely on the way they think 
things ‘should’ be, while being willing means that a person accepts things for what they are and 
focuses on effectiveness in each moment. This requires a consideration of our own values and 
others’ emotions.   
Although this is effective treatment for BPD patients, contemporary American consumer 
society could also benefit from the synthesis of these extremes. Currently, people in a borderline 
society often push forward with what they think is right while ignoring the relative nature of 
right/wrong and how their willfulness affects others. By accepting the unstable nature of 
meaning and values and by realizing that our integration with society is necessary for making 
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meaning, we find a new moral order based on Davis’s (2002) assertion that difference is what 
unites us and social dependence is the norm (26).      
The final film that I will be addressing is an hour-long experimental documentary entitled 
Handsworth Songs (1986), created by the Black Audio Film Collective. This film about the 
Handsworth riots, which took place in London in 1985, is unconventional in the sense that it 
does not include footage of the actual riots themselves. Instead, the film shuffles between scenes 
of police patrolling the streets, interviews about community members’ understandings of the 
riots, archival footage of black migrants, and footage of the news media’s reports. The images 
are accompanied by unpredictable music and a poetic voiceover. The one voiceover phrase that 
is often cited from this film is: “there are no stories in the riots, only the ghosts of other stories.” 
The film aims to show that although the news media wants to make sense out of the riots 
themselves, the stories of why the riots occur actually lie in the history of the black British and 
black migrant experience. Similar to the understanding of BPD that I have laid out, 
contextualized experience, not symptoms, provide understanding.   
 Footage of journalists filming, aesthetically distanced news articles about the riots, and 
politicians calling the riots “senseless occasions completely without reason” show how these 
individuals are constantly disabled by the dominant narrative in British society. These features of 
the film indicate that society is relying on a dominant, culturally constructed moral order instead 
of trying to understand an experience different from their own. In an interview with ARGOS 
Centre for Art and Media, director John Akomfrah (2014) explains that these rioters were the 
offspring of the original black migrants to Great Britain. These young people, coming of age in 
the early 1980s, came to occupy identities between the conceptual categories of British and black 
migrant. The film attempts to find expression for these issues of identity by placing archival 
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footage of migrants traveling to England throughout the film. In this globalized context, the 
offspring of these migrants formed a new identity, one that was both black and British. It was the 
first time that British society had to find a way of fitting these individuals into the symbolic 
order. Akomfrah explains that these individuals were without a sense of belonging. They did not 
know the ‘homeland’ of their parents, but they were also negatively stereotyped and connected 
with that migrant population by the dominant narratives of British society (Akomfrah 2014). 
They came to have a very conflicted relationship with their social environment. 
In an article written for The Guardian in 1987, Salman Rushdie criticizes Handsworth 
Songs for not including more diverse voices of individual subjects involved in the riots. With this 
lack, he asserts that Handsworth Songs has not found a language with which they can 
communicate these unique and diverse British perspectives (Rushdie 2000, 261-263). However, 
continually dividing marginalized individuals is precisely the problem for Lennard Davis, and 
the multitude of subjectivities is problematic for a patient with BPD. This is not to suggest that 
we shouldn’t try to understand and validate the diverse perspectives that exist. But it is 
suggesting that we need to address how we are all non-standard and avoid the pitfalls of strictly 
adhering to a single, stable moral order. If we continually create more distinct voices without 
providing a social order that offers validation for diversity, are we creating equality or only 
dividing and competing with one another? Davis would suggest that continually dividing our 
identities only distracts us from the fact that our difference actually unites us.  
In a response to Rushdie’s assertion that Handsworth Songs fails to find an effective 
language, Stuart Hall (2000) writes: “[w]hat I don’t understand is how anyone watching the film 
could have missed the struggle which it represents, precisely, to find a new language. The most 
obvious thing to me about the film is its break with the tired style of the riot-documentary” (264). 
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In a sense, the film is about a battle over signification. It is this new language that aims to 
include this new identity, one caught between categories of the old narratives. A new language 
between categories challenges the borderline society of extremes, the all-or-nothing mindset. 
This new language expresses the unstable nature of identity and attempts to give a voice to this 
realistic grey area. When the film repeats “there are no stories in the riots, only the ghosts of 
other stories,” it is asking us not to interpret the riots with our old judgments and stereotypes, but 
instead to find the source of these “symptoms.”  
One of the key elements of DBT is called “checking the facts” (Linehan 2014, 319). This 
behavioral skill asks individuals to rely only on the facts that they can observe and not jump to 
judgment by using old assumptions. Handsworth Songs shows us that we cannot understand the 
riots merely by applying our old assumptions. Instead, finding the source in cultural issues of 
identity provides a way to move towards dismodernism. As we have seen that BPD symptoms 
have greater social causes, so too do the riots have greater social causes based on issues of 
identity. The riots and the anger they express are said to be without reason, and the BPD 
diagnosis itself, characterized by intense anger, is stigmatized as irrational by its’ categorization 
as a mental ‘disorder.’ But in both instances this anger is the product of not fitting into the 
dominant symbolic order and being stigmatized and invalidated as a result. Anger and frustration 
express a need for social rapprochement that offers validation.  
Conclusion 
 The diagnosis of BPD has been stigmatized through its symptoms of emotional instability 
and its perception of being difficult to treat. This narrow view of the disorder distracts us from 
the greater social issue of how to maintain a stable validating identity in a contemporary Western 
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environment. In trying to define or categorize individuals through a medical model, societal 
institutions forgo their opportunity for growth. The self, dismodernism, and DBT represent 
processes and not definitive categories that resist change. At the same time, it is important for 
groups and individuals to have a validating moral order to make sense of the world. An ideology 
based on the constant of change, difference, and dependence creates a way of making meaning 
that refuses to invalidate or disqualify individuals. This constant process of recognizing the 
changing dynamics of identity allows for growth, and the realization that we are dependent on 
culture for making sense of our world creates a social rapprochement. It gives validating borders 
to all, when all are seen as non-standard.  
 To bring about these changes, it seems that not only individuals, but also societal 
institutions must begin to reflect this new ideology of instability. DBT provides us with the 
specifics of that new way of looking at the world. We must start by not willfully insisting on 
what we think should be, but instead start from the place of considering what is. If insurance 
companies think that all diagnoses should be treatable according to a fixed set of standards, this 
leaves room for disqualification and creates barriers to access for any who fall outside these 
standards. Accepting ‘what is’ is not a one-time event due to the constant change of relations in 
the world. Any one road to salvation is a myth that only perpetuates suffering. Our ability to look 
at ourselves critically and adjust to our rapidly changing environment is perhaps the only kind of 
social rapprochement that we can justify.  
 Art provides a way to think critically about what a human being is. Film art, by way of 
manipulating time and space, allows us to focus on the rapidly shifting nature of the self in our 
contemporary context. In this way, we can start to see a patient diagnosed with BPD not as 
abnormal, but as simply a human being. Although I have addressed only a small number of 
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films, these readings still provide us with a way of understanding the problems and causes of the 
unstable self. The often non-linear narratives of experimental films force us to look and find 
meaning in new ways. These three films encourage us to find meaning in instability and 
difference. If we can increasingly incorporate this new view as both individuals and societal 
organizations, we get closer to Davis’s dismodernism.  
 The subject matter of this essay may appear extensive, but if its focus were to be more 
specific, it would be difficult to arrive at the argument of how to accomplish dismodernism. 
BPD’s unstable self, or empty self, lends itself to discussing issues of identity that have broad 
applications. Much can still be learned from individuals facing BPD symptoms. Few works have 
attempted to document the words of the patient themselves. Additionally, seeing how symptoms 
are dealt with in commercial and experimental film may aid in further understanding how stigma 
of the diagnosed comes to take shape. At present, a strictly medical view of mental disability 
reduces the socially valuable complexity of an individual’s experience and creates the possibility 
for individuals to be disqualified from contributing to public discourse. This makes it ever more 
urgent for us to investigate what insight into our own society can be extracted by valuing the 
experiences of those who exhibit so-called “abnormal” behavior, thinking, or affect.        
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Bibliography 
 
Akomfrah, John. ARGOS Centre for Art and Media. Dissent! John Akomfrah. Online video. 
34:21. https://vimeo.com/81724319. 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: 
DSM-5. Washington, D.C: American Psychiatric Association, 2013.  
 
Becker, Dana. Through the Looking Glass: Women and Borderline Personality Disorder. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1997. 
 
Black Audio Film Collective. Handsworth Songs. Directed by John Akomfrah. 1986. London: 
Smoking Dogs Films, 2000. DVD.  
 
Boddy, Janice. “Spirits and Selves in Northern Sudan: The Cultural Therapeutics of Possession 
and Trance.” American Ethnologist 15, no. 1 (1988): 4-27.  
 
Cahn, Susan K. “Border Disorders: Mental Illness, Feminist Metaphor, and the Disordered 
Female Psyche in the Twentieth-Century United States.” In Disability Histories, edited 
by Susan Burch and Michael Rembis, 258-282. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
2014. 
Davis, Lennard J. Bending over backwards: Disability, Dismodernism & Other Difficult 
Positions. New York: New York University Press, 2002.  
Deren, Maya. “Cinema as an Art Form.” In Essential Deren: Collected Writings on Film by 
Maya Deren, edited by Bruce R. McPherson, 19-33. Kingston, New York: McPherson & 
Company, 2005. 
Deren, Maya. Maya Deren: Experimental Films. Directed by Maya Deren and Alexander 
Hammid. New York: Mystic Fire Video, 2002. DVD. 
Gergen, Kenneth J. “The Self: Transfiguration by Technology.” In Pathology and the 
Postmodern, edited by Dwight Fee, 100-115. London: Sage Publications, 2000. 
Goffman, Erving. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, Inc., 1963. 
Gottschalk, Simon. “Escape from Insanity: ‘Mental Disorder’ in the Postmodern Moment.” In 
Pathology and the Postmodern, edited by Dwight Fee, 18-48. London: Sage Publications, 
2000. 
 
Gunderson, John G. “Borderline Personality Disorder: Ontogeny of a Diagnosis.” The American 
Journal of Psychiatry 166, no. 5 (2009): 530-539. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3145201/. 
32 
 
Hall, Stuart. “The Handswoth Songs Letters.” In Writing black Britain 1948-1998: An 
Interdisciplinary Anthology, edited by James Procter, 263-264. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000. 
Keller, Sarah. Maya Deren: Incomplete Control. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. 
Kersting, Karen. “Axis II Gets Short Shrift.” Monitor on Psychology 35, no. 3 (2004): 50-51. 
 
Kreisman, Jerold J., and Hal Straus. I Hate You – Don’t Leave Me. New York: Avon Books, 
1989. 
 
Linehan, Marsha. DBT Skills Training Manual. New York: The Guilford Press, 2014. 
 
Pramaggiore, Maria. “Seeing Double(s): Reading Deren Bisexually.” In Maya Deren and the 
American Avant-Garde, edited by Bill Nichols, 237-260. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001. 
Price, Margaret. “Defining Mental Disability.” In The Disability Studies Reader, edited by 
Lennard J. Davis, 298-307. New York: Routledge, 2013. 
 
Rushdie, Salman. “The Handswoth Songs Letters.” In Writing black Britain 1948-1998: An 
Interdisciplinary Anthology, edited by James Procter, 261-263. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000. 
Siebers, Tobin. Disability Aesthetics. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2010. 
Stern, Adolph. “Psychoanalytic Investigation of and Therapy in the Border Line Group of 
Neuroses.” The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 7 (1938): 467-489. 
 
Wirth-Cauchon, Janet. “A Dangerous Symbolic Mobility: Narratives of Borderline Personality 
Disorder.” In Pathology and the Postmodern, edited by Dwight Fee, 141-162. London: 
Sage Publications, 2000. 
 
     
     
 
            
33 
 
 
      
   
 
     
        
   
 
 
